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SUPPRESSION OF NONCONFESSIONAL EVIDENCE UNDER
RULE 5(a) OF FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE*
EVIDENCE obtained as a result of illegal methods of federal law enforcement
is excluded from federal criminal trials.' Federal courts first employed ex-
clusion of evidence to enforce the Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.2 McNabb v. United States 3 extended ex-
clusion to confessions obtained during detention of arrested suspects contrary
to the prompt arraignment requirements of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.4 In both instances, the exclusionary rule sought to pro-
tect the substantive rights of individuals by deterring illegal methods of law
*United States v. Klapholz, 230 F2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956).
1. The Supreme Court formulates general rules for admissibility of evidence under
its authority to establish rules of evidence and procedure for federal courts. Wolfe v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) ; Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 391 (1933). The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codify the principles announced in these decisions.
FED. R. CimI. P. 26. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1, 55
YALE L.J. 694, 702-03 (1946). Drafted by an advisory committee and approved by the
Supreme Court, the rules were submitted to Congress, see 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1952), and
have the effect of law, see Ochoa v. United States, 167 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1948).
In addition to evidence secured by unreasonable search and seizure and illegal detention,
see notes 2 and 3 infra, the Supreme Court has excluded evidence obtained by wiretapping
in violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1064, 1103 (1934), 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1952). See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). And confessions
obtained by police fraud, intimidation or duress have long been subject to exclusion. See,
e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896) ; note 32 infra.
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1882) first applied exclusion against
unreasonable search and seizure. Although the Court relied on both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, Boyd could apparently have been decided solely on the basis of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 638 (concurring opinion);
Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 150 n.25 (1948). Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), first clearly enunciated the rule excluding evidence secured in violation of the
Fourth Amendment alone.
3. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
4. Rule 5(a) provides:
"An officer making an arrest under a search warrant issued upon a complaint or
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person with-
out unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any
other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offences against
the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought
before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthith."
The requirement of commitment "without unnecessary delay" establishes a single standard
for all federal officers. It supersedes varied standards for different government agencies
contained in statutes in effect when McNabb was decided. See Act of March 1, 1879,
c. 125, § 9, 20 STAT. 341, 18 U.S.C. § 593 (1940) (persons arrested for operating illicit
distillery to be arraigned "forthwith") ; Act of Aug. 18, 1894, c. 301, 28 STAT. 416, as
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enforcement.0 Reluctant to hamper unduly the enforcement activities of police
agencies, federal courts have utilized the exclusionary rule with great restraint.6
The rule has thus been employed only where its value as a direct safeguard
of individual rights dearly outweighs the resulting interference with federal
law enforcement.
7
Recently, the Supreme Court broadened the jurisdiction of federal courts
to apply the rule in a decision which may also expand the types of evidence
subject to exclusion. Rea v. United States 8 held that a federal court may sup-
press evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure even if the evidence was to be used in a state prosecution.
In Rea a federal agent who had acquired evidence of narcotics violations by
an unlawful search and seizure was enjoined from testifying against the sub-
ject of the search in a state narcotics prosecution.9 The Court considered the
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940) (arrests by United States Marshals); Act of June
18, 1934, c. 595, 48 STAT. 1008, 5 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1940) (persons arrested by agents of
the FBI to be arraigned "immediately"). See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
342 (1943) ; Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, rule 5(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1952).
5. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 343, 345 (1943) ; Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92, 393-94 (1914). See also Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 150-52
(1948); Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11, 24-25 (1925) ; McCormick, Some Problems and De-
velopments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 239, 270 (1946).
6. In McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927), holding a search warrant valid
under the Fourth Amendment although officers had illegally destroyed the property seized,
the Court declared: "A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the Government
may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not played accord-
ing to rule." Id. at 99. While this may overstate the attitude of federal courts toward
exclusion, it is indicative of their efforts to adapt the exclusionary rule to the needs of
law enforcement. Thus the rule may be invoked only by persons "aggrieved" by illegal
acts, not others against whom evidence may be used. See FED. R. CRIax. P. 41(e);
Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1932) ; Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 144,
153-55 (1948) ; cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 116 (1942). But cf. United
States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494, 498 n.4 (2d Cir. 1956) (excerpted at note 22 infra).
And to avoid a mechanical and inflexible operation of the rule the Supreme Court has
often declared that no formula exists for determining the reasonableness of a search and
seizure, each case requiring decision on its own facts. See United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
See, generally, Comment, 45 J. CRI. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1954). For similar attempts to
reconcile the McNabb rule to police needs, see cases cited in notes 34-38 infra and accom-
panying text.
7. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754-57 (1952) ; United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1944) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
8. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
9. Rea was indicted on evidence obtained through a search warrant issued under rule
41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior to trial he moved to suppress
under rule 41(e) because the warrant lacked probable cause and was thus improperly
issued under rule 41 (c). The district court granted the motion and the federal indictment
was subsequently dismissed. However, the federal agent who had conducted the search
then caused a state arrest warrant to issue for Rea's violation of New Mexico's narcotics
law. The state prosecution rested entirely on the testimony of the federal agent. Prior to
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illegal act to violate federal rule 41 rather than the Fourth Amendment,10
and interpreted the rules to give the judiciary "supervisory powers over
federal law enforcement agencies."" These powers, it held, enabled federal
courts to compel observance of the rules by suppressing evidence obtained in
violation of the law enforcement standards they prescribe. 12 Narrowly inter-
preted, the decision only extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to apply
the exclusionary rule, without affecting the forms of evidence which may be
excluded. The Court's language, however, discloses a possible new basis for
suppression of evidence under the federal rules which ignores the exclusionary
rule's original function of protecting individual rights. Rea's stress on the
the state trial Rea moved in the federal district court to enjoin the agent from testifying.
This motion was denied and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Rea v. United States, 218 F.2d
237 (10th Cir. 1953).
10. See text of rule 4 1(e), note 20 infra.
Reliance on the Fourth Amendment might have forced the Court to reconsider difficult
problems of federal and state criminal jurisdiction. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), the Court declared the exclusionary rule merely a federal rule of Qvidence for
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment and not embodied within it substantively. Thus,
while the substance of the Fourth Amendment is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
and enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 27-33, federal
courts have no power to exclude unlawfully seized evidence from state prosecutio ns.
Furthermore, prior to Rea the Court had refused to enjoin state officers from testifying
in state prosecutions concerning illegally procured evidence. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951). Though the Court indicated that exercise of such general equity pow ers
might be within its discretion, it refused to interfere with a state's administration of its
own laws. The Rea dissent urged that the majority was indirectly doing this although
unwilling to do so openly. 350 U.S. at 218. See Note, 56 COLU.L L. REv. 940 (1956).
11. 350 U.S. at 217. Previous cases applying the exclusionary rule provide no
authority for such an assertion of power. The Court has always based the power to exclude
illegally obtained evidence on its undoubted authority to supervise administration of federal
justice by and in the federal courts. See note 1 supra. In excluding evidence tainted by
federal police illegality, federal courts indicate their refusal to play any part in these illegal
acts. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). In McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943), the Court declared: "We are not concerned with law enforcement
practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement."
See also United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65. 70-71 (1944) ; Note, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
940, 943 (1956).
12. As the Court itself indicated, 350 U.S. at 215, the federal indictment charged a
violation of an Internal Revenue Code provision, 50 STAT. 555 (1937), 26 U.S.C. § 2593(a)
(1952) (now INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 4744(a)). Another law dealing with such viola-
tions, 28 U.S.C. § 2463 (1952), was thus applicable in Rea as a basis for suppression. This
statute provides: "All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United
States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in custody of the law and sub-
ject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction
thereof." The district court's order might reasonably have been considered an "order
and decree" preventing use of the evidence for any purpose, state or federal, and the
injunction merely enforcement of this original order. By thus restricting Rea to its facts,
the Court might reasonably have avoided a broad consideration of federal courts' "super-
visory powers over federal law enforcement agencies." Furthermore, the language of rule
41(e) itself could have upheld the injunction. See note 20 infra.
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duties of police agents suggests exclusion 13 could be used to enforce observ-
ance of the federal rules regardless of the connection a violation may have
to the evidence obtained.
Such an interpretation was adopted by a federal appellate court shortly after
the Rea decision. In United States v. Klaphol 14 the Second Circuit, appar-
ently joining Rea's procedural holding with its substantive implications, ex-
tended the McNabb rule of exclusion to nonconfessional evidence. Arrested
for possessing contraband property, the defendants in Klapholz were arraigned
after a period normally considered excessive under the McNabb rule.' 5 Ques-
tioned after arrest, they had made incriminating admissions and agreed to
cooperate in arresting consignees of the contraband by allowing government
agents to remain with them in their apartment. During the more than thirty-
nine hours the agents were with defendants, they secured further incriminating
admissions and such nonconfessional matter as testimonial evidence of phone
calls overheard and arrests made of persons who came for the contraband.'0
Invoking the Fourth Amendment and the McNabb rule, defendants later
moved in the district of detention, but prior to trial in the district of arrest,'
7
to suppress all evidence the agents had obtained while in the apartment. The
district court held the defendants had waived their Fourth Amendment right
by freely consenting to the presence of the agents in order to assist the arrest
of the consignees. But viewing the detention in the apartment as an "unneces-
sary delay" of arraignment in violation of federal rule 5(a), it applied the
McNabb rule to suppress all evidence obtained during the illegal detention.'
In affirming the order, the Second Circuit necessarily relied on Rea to up-
hold the district court's jurisdiction to suppress any evidence under McNabb.
As the court itself recognized, federal rule 5(a) confers no authority at all
for pre-trial suppression of evidence, and a district court other than the trial
13. For the purposes of this Note the terms "exclusion" and "suppression" are con-
sidered synonymous and will be used interchangeably except where discussion is specifically
directed to procedures employed for enforcing the exclusionary rule.
14. 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 17 F.R.D. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
15. At 3:15 P.M. on August 2, 1954 defendants received a package at Idlewild Air-
port after signing a customs declaration that it contained only glassware. Customs agents
who had observed defendants accosted them and searched the package, discovering a large
cache of undeclared diamonds. Defendants were arrested at 4 P.M. on August 2 but not
arraigned until 1 P.M. on August 4. 17 F.R.D. at 20.
16. Phone calls were overheard at an extension attached to the telephone according
to a pre-arranged agreement with defendants. Ibid.
17. Defendants were arrested in the Eastern District of New York but their apart-
ment was in the Southern District. Ibid.
18. Actually, the district court found that failure to arraign from 8 P.M. on August
2, when defendants and agents first arrived at the apartment, until 10:30 A.M. on August
3, when a United States Commissioner would normally have been available, was not "un-
necessary delay." However, further delay was unjustified and violated rule 5(a). The
court accordingly applied McNabb to suppress only evidence acquired during this latter
period and denied the motion to suppress evidence previously obtained. Though tangible
evidence was produced by search of the apartment just prior to arraignment, this evidence
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
court clearly lacks this power.' 9 Rea, however, involved a violation of rule
41(e), which permits pre-trial suppression by a district court of evidence
obtained within its jurisdiction by unlawful searches and seizures.2 0 Never-
theless, the Second Circuit felt the Supreme Court's "language and rationale"
allowed no distinction between rules 41 and 5(a) on this basis. Apparently,
therefore, the court made two justifiable assumptions in interpreting Rea: the
federal courts' "supervisory powers" over federal police agencies extend to
enforcing the requirements of all the federal rules, and exercise of these powers
by suppressing evidence to be used in another district is analogous to enjoining
use of federally obtained evidence in a state court.
2 '
The appellate court's seeming reliance on Rea to extend the McNabb rule
to all types of evidence is more questionable than its use of the Supreme
was not suppressed since it was secured under a search warrant validly issued on August
2. Id. at 21-24.
19. 230 F.2d at 496-97. But see In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissent-
ing opinion).
20. Rule 41(e) provides:
"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court
of the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property and
to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained .... If the motion is granted
the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it
shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppres.
evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had ...
21. The Second Circuit felt that the "supervisory powers" concept authorized the
Southern District to suppress evidence obtained in violation of rule 5 (a) within the district.
But, as the circuit court itself declared, the district court's action was discretionary since
neither Rea nor any interpretation of rule 5(a) compelled pre-trial suppression by a
court other than the trial court for delay in arraignment. Indeed, there was a much greater
need for pre-trial suppression in Rea. In that case, the injunction was necessary to pro-
vide defendant with any remedy at all, since the testimony of the federal agent would have
been admissible at the impending state trial. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ;
notes 10 and 12 supra. By contrast, defendants in Klapholz could probably have moved tn
suppress in advance of trial in the Eastern District. However, since the government had
not objected to the motion on jurisdictional grounds, the Second Circuit found no abuse
of discretion by the trial court. See 230 F.2d at 497-98.
The Second Circuit's new procedure involves a substantial invasion of the jurisdiction
of the trial court since the order of the Southern District is apparently res judicata at
trial. See Steele v. United States No. 2, 267 U.S. 505 (1925) (previous decision vali-
dating search warrant held res judicata at trial) ; Dowling v. Collins, 10 F.2d 62 (6th Cir.
1926). Furthermore, since the Southern District order was made in an independent equit-
able proceeding, it could be appealed before trial. See 230 F.2d at 498; Dowling v. Collin.,
supra; cf. United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1944). On the
other band, had the motion been made and ruled on before trial by the trial court, the
order would not have been appealable, although improper admission of the evidence
at trial could have been a basis for reversal on appeal following conviction. See Cogen v.
United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223-25 (1929).
The court's theory for suppression under rule 5(a) is thus of substantial benefit to
an accused. Since he now has the valuable option of moving to suppress in the district
of detention as well as the district of trial, he may choose the court most likely to rule in
his favor and may immediately appeal an adverse ruling in the district of detention.
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C-ourt decision on the jurisdictional issue. Though the court did not expressly
invoke Rea in suppressing nonconfessional evidence, it persistently cited lan-
guage clearly suggesting a substantive extension of the exclusionary rule.
22
Furthermore, without the support of Rea the Second Circuit would have
entirely lacked other authority to extend McNabb, and in fact cited none.
Consequently, Rea itself and its exact relation to McNabb and Klaphol
should be reviewed to determine whether the Second Circuit properly employed
the Supreme Court decision to enlarge the scope of evidence excludable under
federal rule 5(a). A second possibility, that the court may have extended
the McNabb rule independently of Rea, also requires critical evaluation.
Initially, it is doubtful the McNabb rule should have been applied to suppress
any evidence in Klapholz. Since the district court found that defendants
waived their Fourth Amendment rights during detention by consenting to
the presence of agents in the apartment,2 its decision, affirmed by the Second
Circuit, that they had not also waived their rule 5 (a) right to prompt arraign-
ment seems anomalous under the facts of Klapholz. The evidence does not
indicate defendants were more fully advised of their Fourth Amendment rights
than of their rule 5(a) safeguards. By consenting to cooperate in the appre-
liension of other criminals they agreed to remain in police custody and thus
were actually responsible for the delay in arraignment. And the district court
itself suggests defendants had full control over the length of delay and could
have terminated the detention at any time by simply refusing further assistance
to the police. In fact, the police promptly arraigned defendants as soon as
they indicated they would no longer cooperate.24 Furthermore, none of the
22. Quoting from Rea, 350 U.S. at 217-18, the Second Circuit declared:
"[Tlhe federal Rules 'are designed as standards for fedeal agents' . . . . When 'a
federal agent has violated the federal Rules governing searches and seizures . . .
[t]he power of the federal courts extend to policing those requirements and making
certain that they are observed' . . . . It is true that here we are concerned with
a suppression based on violation of Rule 5(a) instead of one based on violation of
the Fourth Amendment which is the subject matter of Rule 41. But the language
and rationale of the majority opinion in the Rea case permits no distinction on
that account."
230 F.2d at 497. And later the court said:
"We have no need, therefore, now to determine whether the Rea decision may be
invoked only by those whom federal agents have detained in violation of Rule
5(a) or whether in the exercise of its asserted power to discipline federal agents
the Supreme Court intends that evidence obtained in violation of the Federal
Rules shall be inadmissible even against those not otherwise injured by executive
action."
Id. at 498 n.4.
23. The district court declared: "The record also warrants a finding that the de-
fendants' consent was not the result of coercion, fraud or threat of any kind." 17 F.R.D.
at 21.
24. In United States v. Grote, 140 F.2d 413, 415 (2d Cir. 1944), the Second Circuit
itself established authority for waiver of prompt arraignment, expressly rejecting dictum
in United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943), on which the Klapholz district
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rights rule 5 (a) aims to protect were violated. Before consenting to cooperate,
defendants were advised of their rights against self-incrimination and to coun-
sel,25 one of the main goals of prompt arraignment. And probable cause for
their arrest clearly existed since the arrest, itself never challenged, was the
basis of validly issued search warrants. Inquiry into probable cause, another
purpose of arraignment, was thus not urgent and in any event would have
been a formality.26 Admittedly, as the district court noted, defendants could
have been arraigned in chambers, thus fulfilling the formal requirement of
rule 5(a) and permitting continuation of the plan of cooperation. 27 But co-
operation after arraignment would undoubtedly have produced precisely the
court relied in refusing to allow waiver. In Haupt there was no proof that defendants
had voluntarily waived right to prompt arraignment. However, the court also discussed
whether defendants can ever waive requirements of arraignment statutes similar to rule
5(a). It found that cases of waiver of jury trial, counsel, speedy trial and confrontation
of witnesses involved provisions defining "rights of the individual," while statutory require-
ments of prompt arraignment defined "duties of arresting officers." The court suggested
that allowing persons to "waive" officers' legal duties would defeat the intent of the
arraignment statutes by making these duties depend on the action of individuals rather
than the legislative mandate. Id. at 671.
It seems clear, however, that both rule 5 (a) and the McNabb rule prescribe duties
for arresting officers in order to protect rights of arrested persons. See United States
v. Le'viton, 193 F.2d 848, 862 (2d Cir. 1951.) (dissenting opinion). See notes 29-34 infra
and accompanying text.
25. 17 F.R.D. at 21. See note 30 infra.
26. A preliminary hearing establishes whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant
holding an accused for grand jury action. Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807
(4th Cir. 1944) ; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1228, 1235 (1951). Such evidence constitutes prob-
able cause for arrest. However, the evidence required to establish probable cause for
either arrest or search need not conform to trial standards. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 173, 175-76 (1949) ; Note, 65 YAix L.J. 390, 391 (1956). Brinegar declared
the "probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within .. . [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offence has
been committed." 338 U.S. at 175-76. Citing to this definition of probable cause in
discussing the validity of the search warrants, the Klapholz district court found that
defendants' receipt of the case containing contraband diamonds confirmed information
received from a foreign confidential source concerning its shipment. 17 F.R.D. at 23-24.
The court thus gives considerable weight to the confidential information possessed by the
police which was the basis for defendants' arrest following discovery of the diamonds.
Furthermore, the circumstances of defendants' arrest are analogous to those in an earlier
Second Circuit decision holding such an arrest valid. In United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d
911, 912-13 (1930), federal agents suspected defendant of illegally importing Swiss watch
movements. Their suspicions were verified on finding the contraband goods in a package
which, according to defendant's statements to customs officials, contained chocolates.
Following discovery of the contraband, defendant was arrested and charged with violation
of a smuggling statute, Act of Sept. 21, 1922, c. 356, § 591, 42 STAT. 981, substantially the
same as that involved in Klapholz. See 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1952), which reads in part:
"Proof of defendant's possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the
jury, shall be deemed sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section."
27. 17 F.I.D. at 23.
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same evidence against defendants as was suppressed, for they evidently de-
sired to aid the police. Consequently, failure to arraign was at most a technical
violation of rule 5(a), and it is probable Klapholz did not fall within the
McNabb rule at all.
Even assuming the McNabb rule applicable in Klapholz, the nature and func-
tion of the rule does not justify its extension to nonconfessional evidence. The
Second Circuit's statement that exclusion under McNabb was intended "as a de-
terrent to detention in violation of rule 5 (a)" 28 is an oversimplification not justi-
fied by decisions applying the rule. Actually, the substantive evil McNabb seeks
to prevent is police use of physical and psychological pressures during illegal
detention to secure apparently "voluntary" confessions from arrested suspects.2 9
Prompt arraignment under rule 5 (a) is designed to protect the accused against
such "third degree" practices by immediately affording him the benefits of
counsel, bail 30 and a judicial hearing.31 Prior to McNabb, a detained suspect
28. 230 F.2d at 498.
29. MeNabb thus referred to prompt arraignment statutes:
"[T]his procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known
as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find
their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation
of persons accused of crime."
318 U.S. at 344. See also United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 66-68 (1944) ; 4 REPORT,
NATIONAL Com0mIssIoN ON LAW OBSERVAN cE AND ENFORCEMENT 3, 4, 31-37, 152-72 (1931)
(hereinafter cited as WICKERSHAM! REPORT). And see, generally, HoPxics, OuR LAwLEss
POLICE (1931).
Early applications of the McNabb rule recognize that police use of "third degree"
methods to extort confessions during illegal detention is the primary rationale for ex-
clusion. See, e.g., United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 1943); Gros v.
United States, 136 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1943); Mitchell v. United States, 138 F.2d
426 (D.C. Cir. 1943); United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679, 683 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
Recent cases employing the rule adhere to this view. Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d
736, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1951)
(dissenting opinion) ; Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1951).
Even commentators opposed in varying degrees to the McNabb rule have recognized
its relation to "third degree" practices and coerced confessions. See Waite, Police Reguda-
lion by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. Rv. 679 (1944) ; Inbau, The Confession Dilemma
in the United States Supremne Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948) ; McCormick, Some Prob-
lems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 239 (1946).
See also Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 12, at 11-17, 27-43 (1943) (hereinafter cited as
Hearings). But for a strong argument that illegal detention is itself an evil aside from the
aggravating effects of the "third degree," see A STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE
BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSocIATIoN ON H.R. 3690, at 9-15 (1944) (here-
inafter cited as ABA STATEMENT).
30. On arraignment under rule 5(a) the accused is immediately entitled to protection
of rule 5(b) which provides:
"The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his
right to retain counsel and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall
also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any
statement made by him may be used against him. The commissioner shall allow the
19561
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was protected against such police techniques only if he could show his con-
fession was coerced. The court would then exclude the confession on the
ground that it was untrustworthy or involuntary.3 2 This protection proved
largely ineffectual; in practice a defendant who had confessed was often
unable to present enough proof of coercion to warrant exclusion.33 The Mc-
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the
defendant to bail as provided in these rules."
31. Rule 5 (c) describes the procedure for the preliminary examination.
The protections accorded an accused under rules 5(b) and 5(c) make police use of
"third degree" methods to extort confessions virtually impossible. See ABA STATMEN
15-17. Following committment, the accused is placed temporarily in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons, 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1952), or a United States Marshal, 18 U.S.C. § 4086
(1952). Though United States Marshals are supervised by the Attorney-General, 28
U.S.C. § 547(c) (1952), they are officers of the district court and responsible to it. 28
U.S.C. § 547(a), (b) (1952). And an accused may be visited by friends and counsel
while in custody; if freed on bail he is entirely beyond the reach of the police until trial.
See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1228, 1235 n.35 (1951) ; Comment, 53 id. 758, 769 n.73 (1944).
32. No clear rule exists to which federal courts may refer in excluding coerced con-
fessions. Such confessions have been held inadmissible because they are involuntary,
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944), and untrustworthy, Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 585 (1884). See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1228 & nn.3 & 4 (1951). Distinctions be-
tween voluntariness and trustworthiness are, however, primarily historical rather than
practical since the same evidence of coercion is generally sufficient to exclude on either
grounds. Inbau, smpra note 29, at 442 & n.2, 443; McCormick, The Scope of Prvilege
in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 447, 452-57 (1938). For the view that only
trustworthiness should control see WiGmIoRa, EVIDENCE §§ 822-26 (3d ed. 1940).
In using the voluntary-trustworthy test federal courts have usually relied on lung
standing rules of evidence rather than constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613, 621-23 (1896). Yet in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542
(1897), a forced confession was held violative of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. See McCormick, supra at 451-54. And in Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936), the Court first invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to reverse a state conviction based on a forced confession. Lisbena v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941), later deemed such evidence fundamentally unfair to an accused
"whether true or false." Apparently, therefore, the proper ground for exclusion of federally
obtained coerced confessions is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, though
federal courts have never specifically excluded the confession on this basis. See, however,
suggestions in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 n.2 (1948); Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) ; United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679, 682 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
See also Inbau, supra at 443; Comment, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 759 (1944) ; ABA STATE MEXT 50.
33. Federal trial courts have broad discretion to decide admissibility. See Wilson v.
United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896) ; United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 155 (7th
Cir. 1955). If evidence of coercion is conflicting the judge may admit the confession and
allow the jury to decide credibility. See Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 351 n.1
(1943) ; Wilson v. United States, supra at 624. However, once the defendant raises the
coercion issue the burden of proving the confession was voluntary rests on the government.
See United States v. Echeles, supra at 155; Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 687, 689-
90 (5th Cir. 1950).
The exclusionary rule as actually applied by federal courts affords the defendant a
protection more nominal than real. Since questioning takes place incoummunicado, it i.
invariably difficult for the defendant to establish coercion. See United States v. Mitchell,
(Vol. 66
NOTES
Nabb rule helped an accused overcome this difficult evidentiary obstacle by
automatically excluding the confession on the basis of a presumption that a
confession obtained during illegal detention was coerced.3 4 The most recent
Supreme Court interpretation of the rule indicated the government could
overcome this presumption only by showing the confession was obtained before
the detention became illegal. 35
322 U.S. 65, 63 (1944) ; United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 862 (2d Cir. 1951) (dis-
senting opinion); ABA STATEMENT 17. The defendant must thus rely on his bare
assertion of duress and on the circumstances surrounding his questioning. See Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1897) ; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1884).
And this may not be sufficient to overcome a presumption that an innocent man will not
prejudice his interests by falsely confessing. See Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860,
862-63 (9th Cir. 1929). Furthermore, police officers are likely to deny their wrong. Thus,
even where extrinsic circumstances hint strongly at coercion, see, e.g., Ruhl v. United
States, 148 F.2d 173, 174 (10th Cir. 1945), faced with conflicting testimony, the judge or
jury might be more influenced by an accused's probable guilt than by the possibility his
constitutional rights were violated. See McCormick, supra note 29, at 250. And the judge
may overrule the defendant's objections or admit the confession for the jury's consideration
because of reluctance to brand officers who took it as liars. See McCormick, supra at 250-
51. See, generally, HoPKINs, OuR LAWLESS PoLIcE 288-313 (1931). But see Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 148-54 (1944), where, influenced by McNabb, the Court held a
state confession inadmissible because the circumstances of its acquisition were "inherently
coercive."
34. Neither rule 5(a) nor Supreme Court decisions interpreting it specify what con-
stitutes "unnecessary delay" in arraignment. In McNabb v. United States the Court de-
clared: "the mere fact that a confession was made in custody of the police does not ren-
der it inadmissible." 318 U.S. at 348. Subsequent lower court decisions applied the McNabb
rule inflexibly and mechanically to exclude almost any confession made prior to arraign-
ment, regardless of the length or circumstances of detention. See Mitchell v. United States,
138 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1943) ;
United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 1943). See also unreported cases
cited in Comment, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 763 n.37 (1944). More recently, however, most lower
federal courts have departed from this rigid interpretation and have considered the legality
of detention in terms of its reasonableness under the circumstances. These courts generally
require defendant to prove the detention unreasonable. See, e.g.,Tillotson v. United States,
231 F.2d 736, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir.
1952); United v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 854 (2d Cir. 1951). Nevertheless, it is much
tasier for the accused to establish the fact of illegal detention than that he was forced to
confess during incommunicado interrogation. ABA STATEMENT 17.
35. The Court has never clearly indicated whether the presumption of coercion is con-
clusive on the issue of admissibility, or rebuttable. In United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S.
65, 67, 69 (1944), the Court admitted a confession made shortly after arrest although the
defendant was later detained for eight days without arraignment. Holding that subse-
quent illegality could not require exclusion of the prior voluntary confession, the Court
found the confession was not "induced" by illegal detention. However, Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948), later held that a confession made during illegal de-
tention was inadmissible whether or not it resulted from physical or psychological duress.
Distinguishing Mitchell on the ground the confession there was made before illegal deten-
lion, the Court seemingly indicated that a confession made during illegal detention was
conclusively presumed to be coerced. And evidence of voluntariness could not rebut this
presumption. But Upshaas suggestion that the confession was actually the motive for
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Exclusion under McNabb accordingly demands the existence of a causal
relation-either actual or presumed-between the evidence excluded and the
illegal means used to obtain it. Judicial notice of police activities enables this
causal relation to be justifiably presumed with confessional evidence. 36 Yet
many lower federal courts exclude even such evidence only where circum-
stances clearly indicate the confession obtained was either the motive for
failure to arraign promptly 37 or at least its direct result.38 On the other hand,
no reasonable basis exists for presuming a causal relation between violation
of rule 5 (a) and acquisition of nonconfessional evidence by generalizing from
past experience and knowledge of police techniques. 39 Nor is such detention
as occurred in Klapholz necessarily motivated by a desire to acquire nonconfes-
police illegality leaves this issue in doubt for it is still arguable that the confession there
was produced by illegal detention. Furthermore, the Upshaw dissent interpreted Mitchell to
support the proposition that even confessions made during illegal detention are admissible if
not induced by the detention. Id. at 421-24, 429-34. The District of Columbia Circuit, more-
over, has elaborated this doctrine in a series of more recent cases in which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly denied certiorari. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 202 F.2d 329,
334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 869 (1952) ; Pierce v. United States, 197 F.2d 189,
193 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 846 (1952). See also Watson v. United States,
234 F.2d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d 736, 737-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1956). Other circuit courts have construed Upshaw as automatically excluding
confessions during detentions proved unreasonable. See note 34 supra. But by considering
the government's rebutting evidence on the factual issue of reasonableness of delay in
arraignment, these courts have admitted confessions even where detentions were quite
lengthy. See White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Duncan v. United
States, 197 F.2d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Leviton, 193 F2d 849 (2d
Cir. 1951) ; Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546, 550-51 (9th Cir. 1951) ; United State,
v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949). See, generally, Note, 100 U. PA. L. RFv. 13b
(1951).
36. See, generally, HoPKINS, OuR LAWLESS POLICE (1931); WICK:ERSHAM RErol'.
See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944), for other studies of the relation
between illegal detention and "third degree" practices used to secure confesxions. See
also note 29 supra.
37. See, e.g., Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d 736, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See
also Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 136 (1951).
38. Where the evidence clearly indicates the police failed to arraign promptly for
the very purpose of inducing a confession, the confession so obtained is unquestionably
inadmissible. Often, however, the court must infer this relation between detention and
confession since no clear evidence of improper police motives may exist. See cases cit'd
in note 35 supra.
39. Neither the studies of police activities which greatly influenced the formulation
of the McNabb rule nor the cases interpreting it indicate the rule was intended to apply
to nonconfessional evidence. See, generally, HOPKINS, Oua LAWLESS POLICE (1931);
WICKRSHAm REPORT; Hearings. Even commentators violently opposed to the rule con-
sider only its application to confessions and incriminating admissions. See Waite, supra
note 29; Inbau, supra note 29. Furthermore, the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rule,
of Criminal Procedure which embodied the McNabb rule in rule 5(b) clearly referred to
statements made by a defendant in response to interrogation. ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 (prelim. draft 1943).
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sional evidence against the arrested suspect; it may be used chiefly in order
to secure evidence against others involved in the crime. 40
Moreover, while incommunicado detention provides excellent opportunity
to obtain confessions otherwise difficult to secure, the police will hardly use
it to acquire nonconfessional evidence since far more effective legal means are
available. Klapholz itself dramatically illustrates this as applied to testimony
of police officers. Since the suspects would probably have cooperated in the
same fashion had they been arraigned, the police would have legally acquired
the same nonconfessional evidence against them as was suppressed. Further-
more, such police testimony is generally secured through surveillance of sus-
pected criminals before arrest or arraignment. And tangible evidence, which
though not involved in Klapholz, comes within the Second Circuit's broad
decision, is usually acquired by searches and seizures.41 Delayed arraignment
is thus clearly unnecessary for this purpose. Klapholz's extension of the
McNabb rule thus neglects the causal relation which should exist between
illegal detention and evidence obtained if the rule is properly invoked. The
availability of other routine and legal techniques for securing nonconfessional
evidence suggests the extension will in any case be of minimal practical utility
in preventing evils of police activity against which the rule was originally
designed.
Since neither previous judicial construction of the McNabb rule nor analysis
of the rule itself provides authority for its extension to nonconfessional evi-
dence, any decisional support for Klapholz must be sought in Rea. This sup-
port necessarily rests on the contention that Rea altered the rationale for ex-
clusion under McNabb from deterrence of "third degree" methods to direct
discipline of federal agents for all infractions of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Supreme Court's suppression of evidence for a violation of
rule 41 is thus construed to make police observance of the federal rules an end
in itself. Under this interpretation, delay in arraignment requires suppression
of evidence whether confessional or nonconfessional and regardless of any
curtailment of individual rights.
40. In some cases, however, the evidence obtained may be used against the arrested
suspect. Under conspiracy doctrine, the acts and admissions of one conspirator may be
used to incriminate his co-conspirators. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
If such a causal relation between evidence and illegal detention is actually found to exist,
even nonconfessional evidence should be excluded under the McNabb rule. But where
the detention is voluntary, as in Klapholz, the defendants may consider concessions likely
to result from cooperation to outweigh the possibility of further incrimination. See text
following note 15 supra and notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
41. All tangible evidence secured at the Klapholz apartment was acquired under a
validly issued search warrant. See note 18 supra; Letter from Leonard P. Moore, United
States Attorney, to the Yale Law Journal, June 29, 1956, on file in the Yale Law Library.
Even had there been no search warrant, however, defendants' original waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights might have precluded reliance on the amendment to suppress tangible
evidence. The court might then have suppressed under McNabb despite the obvious lack
of relation between the detention and the tangible evidence secured through search of
the apartment.
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Significant differences between rule 41 and rule 5(a) indicate Rea does not
provide authority for the Second Circuit's decision. Unreasonable searches
and seizures-violations of the Fourth Amendment itself statutorily embodied
in rule 41-directly produce the evidence later suppressed; a causal relation
between the violation and the evidence secured is thus always self-evident.
Moreover, federal courts have refused to suppress evidence because of seem-
ingly technical and inadvertent infringements of the Fourth Amendment or
rule 41, holding these so minor as not to be violations at all. 42 Whenever such
infringements have been the apparent basis for suppression, the violation had
in fact reached the very substance of the protection afforded.42 On the other
hand, violations of rule 5(a) do not uniformly contain the causal factor.44
Only where it is presumed or found has evidence been suppressed in the past.
And because courts have placed strong emphasis on the need for a causal re-
lation between confession and illegal detention, Rea probably did not intend to
reach violations of rule 5 (a) not involving this factor.
This causal relation, in fact, should be a necessary condition of any suppres-
sion of evidence if the rule is properly to accomplish its acknowledged objective
of protecting individual rights while permitting the most efficient law enforce-
ment. Mechanical applications of a rule like that of MllcNabb without regard
to the causal factor would often place irrelevant technicalities in the path of
criminal administration. 45 Such results have been upheld on the ground that
the exclusionary rule expresses community sentiment favoring strict observ-
42. See McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 98 (1926) (illegal destruction of
property seized in search) ; Hurley v. United States, 300 Fed. 75 (1st Cir. 1924) (same) ;
Giacolone v. United States, 13 F2d 108, 109 (9th Cir. 1926) (failure to leave copy of
warrant and receipt for property taken); United States v. Clark, 298 Fed. 533 (S.D.
Ala. 1924) (same). And failure to give a receipt for the items takexn did not invalidate
the search or constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment in Klapho!z itself. 17 F.RD.
at 24.
43. Even slight deviations from the requirement of particularity of description of
the premises to be searched have been held to violate the Fourth Amendment protection
against general exploratory searches. See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324,
326 (7th Cir. 1955) (affidavit established probable cause to search the residences of four
persons referred to by aliases; warrant directing search of entire building consisting of
four apartments insufficient for lack of particularity) ; Bucari v. Fili, 31 F. Supp. 433 (M.D.
Pa. 1940) (search warrant describing premises as next door, south, of 512 Main Street in
Old Forge insufficient description where there was a North and South Main Street in
Old Forge).
In Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932), the Court again invalidated a search
warrant because it infringed another apparently technical requirement. Sgro held that
violation of the statutory ten-day period for return of the warrant, see FED. R. CRi.m. P.
41 (d), made the warrant invalid. However, a substantive right was involved. Seasonable
return of the warrant was held closely related to the necessity that probable cause exist
when a warrant is issued. The Court found in effect that after ten days probable cause
for the search no longer existed, and that it must be shown again to procure a new
warrant. Sgro v. United States, supra at 210-11.
44. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
45. See Hearings 1-10, 32-34.
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ance of statutory procedures by federal agents.46 Adherents of a disciplinary
approach further argue for applying exclusion to every police infraction on the
theory that rights of every member of the community are jeopardized each
time federal agents violate constitutional or statutory safeguards.4 7 These argu-
ments; however, overlook the duty of federal courts to implement all aspects
of law enforcement, not simply one over others equally important. The police
must effectively protect the community from criminal activity. When the
protection an exclusionary rule affords to individual rights is more theoretical
than real, applying the rule places a needlessly heavy burden on law enforce-
ment agencies.4 3 The exclusionary rule is therefore at best a practical compro-
mise for reconciling conflicting values neither of which can be denied, and
courts must have some standard by which to determine whether specific viola-
tions warrant its application. The most effective device presently available
for satisfying these demands is the requirement of a causal relation between
illegality and evidence secured.
46. For the classic statement of this view, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 469-85 (1928) (dissenting opinions).
47. Ibid.; ABA STATEMENT 3-23.
48. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948) (dissenting opinion); Waite,
Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REv. 679 (1944) ; Inbau, The Con-
fession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948) ; Hear-
ings 46-60.
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